Another Plan Colombia is no solution for Central America migration crisis

Julia Duranti, Witness for Peace Colombia

While the least-productive Congress in history went on vacation in August without addressing the Central American child refugee crisis, others opined about possible solutions. In an August 5 op-ed in the Los Angeles Times, Luis Alberto Moreno, president of the Inter-American Development Bank, suggested policymakers look further south to Colombia and use the $8 billion Plan Colombia aid package as a model for U.S. assistance to the Northern Triangle countries of El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras. On August 18, Daniel Runde of the Center for Strategic and International Studies echoed the call in a blog for Foreign Policy.

This is a deeply flawed recommendation for a number of reasons. Plan Colombia was never intended to be a development aid package, but rather a counternarcotics and counterinsurgency strategy at a time when the largest guerrilla insurgency, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), posed a serious risk to the Colombian state. At that time, Colombia was also the world’s top producer of cocaine destined for the U.S. In keeping with the War on Drugs supply-side reduction doctrine, policymakers claimed that by eliminating coca crops—which contain the basic compound needed to process cocaine— rather than reducing the demand for cocaine, they could eradicate the drug problem in the U.S.

They were wrong. While coca production in Colombia initially decreased after Plan Colombia took effect in 2000, it has since stabilized at close to 120,000 acres, and coca cultivation in the neighboring Andean nations of Peru and Bolivia has increased. Nearly fifteen years later, overall cocaine production between the three countries has dropped, but this is a complex phenomenon that also has to do with shifting demand, like reduced cocaine consumption in the U.S.—where heroin use is on the rise. Colombia is still the top supplier of cocaine the U.S., with about 95 percent of the market. Violent groups continue to struggle over access to trafficking routes and processing labs.

The military equipment and training supplied to Colombian state security forces as part of Plan Colombia simply added fuel to the fire in a half-century long conflict for land and natural resources. This conflict involves other armed actors in addition to the guerrillas:  paramilitary death squads, or what the Colombian government now calls “criminal bands.” The Colombian military has a long and storied history of collaborating with these groups to commit some of the worst human rights violations in the 50+ year war, including murders, massacres, forced disappearances, torture and sexual assault.

In a particularly chilling practice known as “false positives,” Colombian military systematically murdered innocent civilians and then dressed them up in guerrilla fatigues, presenting them as enemy kills in order to gain rewards like bonuses and extra vacation time. This practice, it bears mentioning, was developed as part of the “body count” mentality promoted through U.S. training. The Colombian government has opened investigations into 5,000 such cases since the scandal broke in 2005.

It is true that homicides and violent crime have decreased since Plan Colombia began, but only because the conflict has been pushed to the most remote, rural areas of the country. Assassinations have become more targeted as illegal armed actors increasingly rely on threats and forced disappearances, which are harder to classify as politically-motivated crimes. Periods of relative calm in historically violent cities like Medellín and Cali are often the product of the victory of one particular criminal group that then controls the area or truces between rival gangs, rather than better work from law enforcement structures, which continue to at least tacitly support criminal gangs in many areas. Politicians at all levels, from local to national, have been implicated in these narcoparamilitary structures.

Taken together, the aggressive counternarcotics and counterinsurgency agenda pushed by Plan Colombia and funded by U.S. taxpayers has worsened, not improved, Colombia’s human rights crisis. Colombia’s internally displaced population is 5.7 million strong—second in the world only to Syria. The U.S. has never seen a flood of Colombian refugees, but that is because of geographic barriers, not because these refugees don’t exist.

The Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with Colombia, another much-touted growth strategy, has also done little to improve the situation. Colombia´s trade balance with the U.S. has plummeted 200 percent, down from a surplus of $950 million just last year. Meanwhile, the economic growth that Colombia has seen recently is limited to extractive industries, which have serious, destructive environmental impacts, and were not even a target industry under the FTA. Despite stating a commitment to improve Colombia´s abysmal labor rights record under the Labor Action Plan, Colombia is still the most dangerous country in the world for trade unionists, who continue to be threatened and assassinated with impunity. Labor conditions remain precarious, with 60 percent of the workforce employed informally and 30 percent of the country’s population living in poverty.

Faced with these figures, it is hard to argue that Plan Colombia is any kind of solution for the Central American refugee crisis. But powerful defense lobbyists will certainly try; indeed, they already have. U.S. military aid to Colombia has decreased in recent years, first to increase military aid to Mexico to wage a similarly fruitless War on Drugs as part of the Mérida Initiative, and then to decrease aid to both countries in order to prioritize the Central America Regional Security Initiative (CARSI). This shifting production and trafficking of drugs and accompanying violence from Colombia to Mexico to now Central America is the perfect example of U.S. whack-a-mole drug and crime policy at work and illustrates much more failures than successes. Until we hold our policymakers accountable to recognizing that, we will continue to see thousands of migrant children arriving at our borders.

"Immigration Problem"

Spoken word by Hillary Watson (delegate of a WfP delegation in Colombia) about U.S policy with Latin America and the consequent "immigration problem."

December 1: Mexican Presidential Power Transitions from one Human Rights Violator to the Next

by Carlin Christy, Mexico Team

Felipe Calderón and Enrique Peña Nieto. Photo from lamendigapolitica.com

This December 1^st, it might have been possible for Mexicans to breathe a collective sigh of relief. The day will mark the official end of President Felipe Calderón’s 6 year term. His presidency is commonly referred to as “el sexenio de la muerte” or ‘the six year term of death,’ given the murders of around 80,000 people which began after Calderón launched a militarized war on drugs shortly after taking office in late 2006.  However, a respite from the massacres, kidnappings, disappearances, and human rights abuses does not seem to be on the horizon, as the presidential power will transition to Enrique Peña Nieto, a member of Mexico’s Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) which ruled Mexico for 71 consecutive years until the year 2000. 

Peña Nieto comes into office under questionable election results and with an already tarnished human rights record from his time as governor of the State of Mexico from 2005-2011. Certain actions he has taken since winning the July election also seem to indicate he won’t stray too far from the course of Calderón, or Mexico’s financial and strategic partner in the war, the U.S. government and military contractors. 

Although he has stated he will no longer seek to confront cartels head on by taking out capo leaders, Peña Nieto plans to create, strengthen, and professionalize a unified 40,000 strong police force, continue the use of the army until no longer necessary, and expand prisons. He will continue to cooperate strategically with the U.S. and just this week met with President Obama to discuss the continued economic and security integration of Mexico and the U.S.   

Considering Peña Nieto will not drastically alter the approach to fighting organized criminal groups, it is worth looking at the impact this militarized drug war has had on Mexican society under Calderón, with support from the U.S’s Mérida Initiative.

Statistics from Mexico’s National Human Rights Commission (CNDH) recently shared in a meeting with the Senate’s Human Rights Commission paint a dismal picture. The CNDH cited information compiled from January 1, 2005 to July 31, 2012. Five out of the seven and a half years were under Calderón’s administration. 

CNDH data reveals:

·         Cases of torture have increased 500% (In 2005 only 1 torture complaint was received, compared to over 2,000 complaints of torture and cruel treatment in 2011)

·         9000+ complaints of arbitrary detentions, which demonstrates that this is a recurring practice utilized by security forces. Arbitrary detentions increased 121% during this time period.

·         5,568 complaints were received about officials failing to follow required procedures in issuing or executing search warrants

·         2,126 cases of forced disappearances are under investigation and in general, forced disappearances saw massive increases

·         24,091 people are reported as missing

·         46,015 documented murders

·         15,921 bodies remain unidentified

·         1,421 bodies were found in mass graves

·         34,385 complaints against federal security forces were received by the CNDH. (An increase of 84% in the last three years.) Complaints mainly centered around illegal searches, forced disappearances, arbitrary detentions, extrajudicial executions, and torture.

 For me, you were “The Employment President.” 

(image taken from Mexicambio on Facebook)

In addition to data from the National Human Rights Commission, a recent national survey on the perception of citizen security indicated that 55% of Mexicans believe Calderon’s strategy to fight organized crime “was unsuccessful”. Eighty percent indicated that insecurity was worse this year than in 2011. Just 31% of those surveyed were in agreement of the use of military operatives to combat organized crime- a ten percent drop from the start of Calderón’s presidency. 

Yet behind all of the data, statistics and numbers are stories of mothers searching for their disappeared children, families mourning their murdered loved ones, communities fighting to demand justice for crimes committed by security forces. Mexico’s social fabric has been torn apart over the last six years. The pain and suffering of people like Maria Trujillo Herrera, who has four disappeared sons, is indescribable. Yet she and many other victims continue to speak out, at the risk of their own lives, against the absurdity of fighting a war on drugs. 

Another woman who speaks out against the violence and impunity endemic to the Mexican state is Paty Torres. She is among the 26 women who were arrested, tortured, and sexually abused during the violent police repression of the town San Salvador Atenco in 2006.

Paty Torres, survivor of sexual assault by Mexican Police forces in 2006.

Photo by: Liliana Zaragoza Cano  courtesy of website: http://miradasostenida.net/ 

In 2001, the community located in the State of Mexico was the site of protest by a group of farmers opposed to the expropriation of their land to construct an international airport.  Opposition to the plan was so strong it was cancelled. When a conflict broke out over a highway blockade in May 2006, the state government, some say seeking revenge for the 2001 protests, responded by sending in thousands of federal police, armed with firearms and teargas.

Over two hundreds civilians, including members of the campesino group and their supporters, were arbitrarily detained and brutally beaten. Two young people were killed and women in particular were subjected to verbal and psychological abuse as well as sexual torture.  Several detainees remained imprisoned up to four years after the attack. 

The operation in Atenco, characterized by human rights groups as the ”excessive and indiscriminate use of force” occurred under Enrique Peña Nieto as governor. To date, no state or federal police officer or official involved in the attack has been brought to justice, despite a recommendation from The United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) to investigate and bring to trial those responsible. 

Twelve of the 26 women, including Paty Torres, have brought their case to the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, after failing to receive justice in the Mexican judicial system.

The Atenco case represents the flagrant abuse of human rights, criminalization of social protest, and total impunity authorized and employed by Peña Nieto while governor. Give this history, many civil society groups, activists, and human rights organizations believe the landscape for human rights in the next Presidential administration looks bleak.

The naming of Colombian General Oscar Naranjo as his top security advisor is further cause for concern. Gen. Naranjo is the former head of the Colombian National Police, and is seen as a key figure in the dismantling of Colombia’s major drug cartels.  However, Naranjo is accused of using back room dealings, favoring certain cartels over others, and utilizing corrupt DEA and U.S. Customs officials to achieve his aims.  In addition, the naming of Naranjo signifies Peña Nieto will be favorable to the U.S.’s agenda of military intervention into Latin America as a whole.

This December 1^st, instead of exhaling a sigh of relief that should have come after six years of unimaginable violence and insecurity, Mexican citizens may have to inhale even deeper, in order to face the next six years. Or instead, they can do as so many have done throughout the country’s history—organize, resist, and struggle against the powers that for so long have marginalized and repressed those who dare to demand justice and equality in Mexico.

Election Blog Series - Drug Policy Reform at Home and Abroad

WFP Colombia Team

With the end of the U.S. presidential election, political commentators have begun predicting what the differences and similarities will be between the next four years and the last four. A slew of articles were dedicated to U.S. policy toward Latin America. Latin Americans heavily favored President Obama in the elections. In Colombia, we watched as a small town held mock elections for the U.S. President, which Obama won handily for the second time. Mitt Romney didn’t even have a campaign manager. The feeling is similar across the region. According to a poll in Chile, Latin Americans in 18 countries selected President Obama as their favorite leader in the Americas. However, respect for President Obama does not mean people are content with his policies or with the relationship between the United States and their countries. U.S. drug policy in the region illustrates this divergence.

While overshadowed by pocketbook issues, drug policy reform is urgently needed. There is growing tension between the U.S. and Latin American governments over the current approach to tackling this joint problem, and its impacts have been felt throughout the Americas. Launched more than 40 years ago, the War on Drugs intended to curb drug use at home by stemming production abroad. Unfortunately, it failed to achieve either goal. At home, punitive policies have failed to address the problems directly related to drugs and drug use, such as abuse, addiction, and adolescent use. Instead, they have led to human rights abuses, racist enforcement patterns, and landed unprecedented levels of nonviolent drug offenders in prison. In Latin America, a militarized drug interdiction and source-eradication strategy has not curbed production or trafficking. It has instead lead to increased displacement, migration, mass human rights violations and the loss of tens of thousands of lives.

Today people from across the Americas, spanning from civil society actors to former and sitting presidents, including some of our closest allies in the drug war, are calling for a new approach to drug policy. Given Latin American leaders’ growing discontent with U.S. policies, shifts in the region’s political ideology, and the joint nature of many issues confronting the Americas, President Obama will need not be able to continue ignoring Latin America in his second term.


Drug Policy under President Obama

The Obama Administration has made positive steps toward investing in drug demand reduction programs in the United States. The Office on National Drug Control Policy’s statements have emphasized drug treatment and prevention programs rather than criminal justice solutions. Still, the Administration’s rhetoric has not been met with adequate substantive reforms. The Fair Sentencing Act reduced the criminal penalty disparity between crack and powder cocaine from 100:1 to 18:1. Though a step in the right direction, the law reduced rather than eliminated racist law enforcement policies.

The Obama Administration has also endorsed the current militarized strategy of the War on Drugs, continuing its failed and harmful policies abroad. It has not only continued providing hundreds of millions of dollars in military aid to fight the drug war in Mexico and Colombia, but exported the same model to Central America, and especially Honduras. In order to skirt human rights restrictions on aid, the U.S.-backed Colombian security forces are now providing training to Honduran security forces, both of which have dismal human rights records. Mexico also tapped a retired Colombian police chief to be a security adviser in spite of his alleged ties to illegal paramilitary groups. Without a fundamental change in militarized drug policy in Latin America, innocent civilians will continue to be the ones who bear the brunt of the violence. This reality was underscored for the Obama Administration after a DEA-led operation killed four civilians.

Governor Mitt Romney didn’t offer any alternatives to the status quo either. He called for an end to medical marijuana use, characterizing it as a wrong step in the direction of drug regulation. He has also called for continued militarization of the War on Drugs abroad, and, had he been elected, would likely have ramped up military aid while decreasing social aid.

There is little difference between the presidential candidates on drug policy, though President Obama seems more willing to discuss alternatives. The real policy difference is between the United States and Latin American countries. Most Latin American heads of state expressed their discontent with the U.S. War on Drugs at the Summit of the Americas in May 2012. Even hard-line conservative governments, including Guatemalan President Otto Perez Molina, a retired military general, recognize the status quo as ineffective and demand alternatives. At the very least, the United States government should recognize its declining ability to maintain the status quo and welcome a policy debate. Washington will not be able to dictate its policy to leaders in the region if they are no longer willing to listen.


First Test for Reform: Starting At Home

As Colorado and Washington voters went to the polls this past Tuesday and re-elected Obama, they also voted to legalize recreational use of marijuana, and lawmakers must draft laws guiding its regulation and sale. It is the first time any U.S. state has approved the legal regulation of marijuana, and many are hailing it as progress and comparing it to the beginning of the end of alcohol prohibition. It is unclear what will happen just yet, as both initiatives are in direct violation of federal law. Before the measures were passed, the Department of Justice remained silent when asked how it would respond if voters favored marijuana regulation. Afterward, a representative said federal drug law “remains unchanged” but declined to comment on the states’ initiatives until after further review.

Drug policy reform advocates remain hopeful but uneasy, unsure how the Obama Administration will respond to the measures. It could invoke federal law, but doing so would indicate a complete disregard to the will of voters. "In fact, more people voted in favor of marijuana regulation in the ‘swing state’ of Colorado than for Barack Obama," commented the Drug Policy Alliance’s Daniel Brito. "Advocates of the status quo will have to concede that this is now absolutely a mainstream issue fit for rational discussion, unless they think Barack Obama is somehow a fringe candidate, with his mere 51% support, compared to 54.8% support for allowing adults to choose marijuana over alcohol."

This instance provides a first test for President Obama on drug policy reform. How the government responds to the measures at home could be a signal for how it will react to dissent abroad. The domestic response itself could have a significant impact abroad. For example, regulation in the United States could decrease marijuana exports from Mexico, thereby reducing the power of violent Mexican cartels. These measures are therefore positive from an international perspective as well.