"Our conflict is not internal, but imposed": Lessons from Colombia for U.S. aid to Central America

By Julia Duranti, Witness for Peace Colombia

In a January op-ed for the New York Times, Vice President Joe Biden called for $1 billion in aid to Central America to address the migration and human rights crisis, citing Colombia as a successful example of U.S. intervention in Latin America. More details on the State Department’s proposal for the Northern Triangle have since emerged, and it appears that social, economic and development aid programs comprise 80 percent of the requested funds—a perfect inversion of Plan Colombia’s counternarcotics and counterinsurgency aid approved 15 years ago. While deemphasizing military aid is a positive development, the current proposal from the Department of State would maintain military and security funding for Central America at current levels, in addition to the separate Department of Defense budgets for foreign military aid.

There is also troubling language about “trade promotion” and economic development that is code for Washington Consensus policies of free trade, privatization and foreign investment.  The current fraught reality in Colombia, a partial result of Plan Colombia and its successor programs and a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with the U.S. implemented in 2012, demonstrates that throwing money at the related issues of organized crime, violence and forced displacement – instead of addressing how the same policies actually drive those phenomena – does not solve human rights crises in Latin America.

U.S. intervention in Colombia has been expensive, costing U.S. taxpayers over $9 billion since 2000, not to mention the enormous human cost of the militarization of Colombia’s countryside. Of the seven million victims of the conflict registered since 1954, 5.9 million victimizations have occurred since 2000, when U.S. funding began to support Colombian security forces already known for collaboration with brutal paramilitaries. While paramilitaries officially demobilized in 2005, many simply reformed into loosely organized criminal structures that the Colombian government calls BACRIM, or criminal gangs. The BACRIM act as guns-for-hire involved in drug trafficking, illegal mining, extortion, human trafficking, and protection services for wealthy land and business owners along with multinational corporations.

Now the biggest threat to citizen security, the BACRIM carry out threats, forced disappearances and assassinations against members of Colombian social movements. In January they were responsible for a wave of threats against Colombian journalists and human rights defenders, as well as the 2014 spike in death threats against more than 150 human rights workers, activists and politicians, dubbed “Black September.” The splintering and reclassification of the paramilitaries as BACRIM allows their activities to be painted as a “climate of lawlessness” that justifies U.S. intervention and support for the Colombian state—as if both states had not tacitly encouraged the creation of these groups in the first place via proxy financial support to corrupt armed forces and neoliberal economic policies that decimated economic opportunities outside the informal or illegal sectors.

At six million people, Colombia’s internally displaced population is the second largest in the world. Some are rural farmers driven from their land by Plan Colombia-funded militarization and aerial herbicide fumigations intended to eradicate coca crops. In other cases, powerful monoculture palm oil and banana operations have collaborated with legal and illegal armed actors to force communities off their land. Additional examples of this type of development include sugar cane production for ethanol that has all but replaced agriculture in southwestern Colombia, while the cut flower industry heavily promoted by USAID has devastated food security in the savannah region surrounding the capital of Bogotá.

Even as the U.S. government has promoted these industries in Colombia, it has protected U.S. corporate interests by privileging U.S. corn, ethanol and other agricultural exports to Colombia under the FTA. In the three years since the FTA was implemented, U.S. exports to Colombia have skyrocketed and Colombia has seen its trade surplus of $8.7 billion evaporate and balloon into a trade deficit of $2 billion. Unable to compete with the flood of subsidized U.S. imports, small-scale producers have been driven out of the market, prompting thousands of Colombians to take to the streets in protest of the FTA and related policies in 2013 and 2014.

Violent displacement, the proliferation of paramilitarism via BACRIM, some of the highest corruption in Latin America, widespread impunity for human rights violations and one of the largest gaps between rich and poor in the world continue to haunt Colombia as problems that Plan Colombia successor programs and the FTA failed to address, or even exacerbated. Implementing the same strategy in Central America — already reeling from high violence and crime along with its own FTA with the U.S., DR-CAFTA — is unlikely to lead to better results. If the Obama Administration wants to get serious about a plan for Central America, it should pressure Congress to fund policies that address the true drivers of organized crime and forced migration, like U.S. demand for drugs and harmful trade agreements that privilege large corporations and the wealthy elite at the expense of local economies and communities. 

"Nuestra guerra no es interna, sino impuesta": Lecciones desde Colombia sobre la ayuda EE.UU a América Central

Por Julia Duranti, APP Colombia

En un editorial que escribió en enero para el New York Times, el Vice Presidente estadounidense Joe Biden solicitó mil millones de dólares de ayuda para América Central con el propósito de abordar las crises de la migración y de los derechos humanos, nombrando a Colombia como un ejemplo exitoso de la intervención estadounidense en América Latina. Desde entonces se han dado a conocer más detalles de la propuesta del Departamento del Estado para el Triángulo del Norte, y pareciera que los programas de desarrollo social y económico representarán el 80 por ciento de los fondos pedidos – una perfecta versión a la inversa de la ayuda antinarcóticos y contrainsurgencia que fue aprobada hace 15 años como parte del Plan Colombia. Aunque la reducción de la proporción del presupuesto que representa la ayuda militar es un paso positivo, la propuesta del Departamento del Estado mantendrá los fondos de carácter militar o de seguridad en sus niveles actuales para América Central, que se suman al otro presupuesto de ayuda militar extranjero que maneja el Departamento de Defensa.

Existe también un discurso preocupante alrededor de la “promoción del comercio” y el desarrollo económico que quiere decir las mismas políticas del consenso de Washington que son el comercio libre, la privatización y la inversión extranjera. La complicada realidad actual de Colombia, un resultado parcial del Plan Colombia y sus programas sucesores y de un Tratado de Libre Comercio (TLC) con los EE.UU  implementado en el 2012, demuestra que tirar más dinero a la basura en las problemáticas interrelacionados del crimen organizado, la violencia y el desplazamiento forzado – en lugar de abordar cómo esas mismas políticas empujan esos fenómenos – no resuelve las crises  de los derechos humanos en América Latina.

La intervención estadounidense en Colombia ha sido cara, costándole a los contribuyentes estadounidenses más de U$9 mil millones desde el 2000, sin mencionar el enorme costo humano de la militarización del campo colombiano. De los siete millones de víctimas del conflicto armado que se han registrado desde 1954, 5,9 millones de las victimizaciones han ocurrido desde el 2000, momento en el que los fondos estadounidenses comenzaron apoyar a las fuerzas públicas colombianas, algunas de las cuales ya eran conocidas por su colaboración con los brutales paramilitares. Oficialmente los paramilitares se desmovilizaron en el 2005, pero muchos simplemente se integraron a diversas estructuras criminales que el estado colombiano ahora llama BACRIM, o bandas criminales. Las BACRIM funcionan como armas contratadas involucradas en el narcotráfico, la minería ilegal, la extorción, el trato humano, y la prestación de servicios de seguridad privada para ricos latifundistas y empresarios junto con empresas multinacionales.

Ahora las BACRIM son la amenaza más grande a la seguridad ciudadana y llevan a cabo amenazas,  desapariciones forzadas y asesinatos en contra de los miembros de los movimientos sociales colombianos. En enero fueron responsables por la onda de amenazas contra varios periodistas y defensores de derechos humanos colombianos, además del aumento de amenazas contra más de 150 defensores de derechos humanos, activistas y políticos en el 2014 conocido como Septiembre Negro. La fracturación y reclasificación de los paramilitares como BACRIM permite que sus actividades sean ilustradas como parte de un “clima de ilegalidad” que justifica la intervención y el apoyo estadounidense al estado colombiano – como si ambos estados no hubieran ya promocionado tácitamente la creación de estos grupos en primer lugar por medio del apoyo financiero a unidades corruptas de las fuerzas públicas y las políticas económicas neoliberales que diezmaron las oportunidades económicas fuera de los sectores informales o ilegales.

Con seis millones de personas, la población internamente desplazada de Colombia es la segunda mayor en el mundo. Algunas son personas de zonas rurales sacadas de sus tierras por la militarización y las aspersiones de áreas con herbicidas que pretenden erradicar cultivos de coca, financiadas por el Plan Colombia. En otros casos, poderosos proyectos de monocultivos de palma y banano han colaborado con los actores legales e ilegales para despojar a las comunidades de sus tierras. Otros ejemplos de esta clase del desarrollo incluyen la producción de la caña de azúcar para etanol que casi reemplaza a la agricultura en el suroccidente de Colombia, mientras la floricultura promocionada por USAID ha devastado la soberanía alimentaria en la sabana alrededor del capital, Bogotá.

A la vez que el estado estadounidense ha impulsado aquellas industrias en Colombia, ha protegido intereses empresariales estadounidenses a través del privilegio de las exportaciones estadounidenses de maíz, etanol y otros productos agrícolas a Colombia bajo el TLC. En los tres años desde que el TLC fue implementado, las exportaciones estadounidenses a Colombia han subido vertiginosamente y Colombia ha visto su superávit comercial de $8,7 mil millones evaporarse y convertirse en un déficit de $2 mil millones. Sin la capacidad de competir con la inundación de las importaciones subsidiadas de los EE.UU, los productores y productoras de pequeña escala han sido expulsados del mercado, lo cual inspiró miles de colombianos y colombianas salir a las calles en protesta por el TLC y las políticas relacionadas del 2013 y el 2014.

El desplazamiento violento, la proliferación del paramilitarismo a través de las BACRIM, una de las tasas de corrupción más alta en América Latina, la impunidad para las violaciones de los derechos humanos y una de las brechas más amplias en el mundo entre ricos y pobres continúan afligiendo a Colombia como problemas que los programas sucesores del Plan Colombia y el TLC no lograron solucionar, o incluso exacerbaron. Es poco probable que la implementación de la misma estrategia en América Central – que ya está lidiando con altas tasas de violencia y crimen además de su propio TLC con EE.UU, DR-CAFTA – produzca mejores resultados. Si el gobierno de Obama quisiera hacer un plan serio para América Central, debería presionar al Congreso de EE.UU para que financie políticas que abarquen las causas verdaderas del crimen organizado y la migración forzada, como la demanda estadounidense de drogas y los dañiños TLCs que privilegian a las empresas grandes y a las élites a costa de las económicas locales y de las comunidades. 

Migrant’s Dream of Reaching the U.S. Cut Short in Mexico

By Carlin Christy
International Team - Mexico

Like many other Central Americans, nineteen-year-old Julio Fernando Cardona Agustín left behind his loved ones and his home in Guatemala in search of better opportunities in the United States. Originally from a village in the eastern part of the country, Julio Fernando was indigenous Mam. His Spanish was limited, which would present an additional challenge to life in the United States as he would face the struggle of not only learning English, but also Spanish.

Upon arriving in Arriaga, Chiapas in late July, Julio Fernando joined a caravan comprised of migrants, activists for migrants’ rights, and family members whose loved ones have disappeared or lost their lives on the journey northwards. One of the caravan leaders was Catholic priest Alejandro Solalinde, who runs a migrant shelter in Ixtepec, Oaxaca. For years, he has been an outspoken critic of the abuses endured by the hundreds of thousands of Central American migrants who, pushed by poverty and political insecurity in their homelands, cross Mexico each year in hopes of reaching the United States.

Entitled “Paso a Paso Hacia la Paz” (Step by Step Toward Peace), the caravan called for an end to the abuses regularly endured by these migrants and demanded reforms to their legal status while passing through Mexico. The caravan traversed two of the routes commonly taken by Central American migrants and finished in Mexico City.

During a meeting with the Senate’s Human Rights Commission, caravan members insisted the Mexican government stop acting like policemen for the United States. Father Solalinde further criticized the government’s attitude of submission towards U.S. interests, whilst acting like “a*******” towards Central Americans. Additionally, migrants gave testimonies about the myriad of dangers they face, from organized criminal groups to local thugs, police at all levels, and even immigration officials. These abuses include theft, extortion, beatings, kidnappings, rape, forced prostitution, and murder. Not to mention the inherent dangers of riding on top of “La Bestia” (The Beast) or “El Tren de la Muerte” (The Death Train), as migrants commonly refer to the high-speed cargo trains that serve as a means of transportation northwards.

Despite these obstacles that regularly result in the injury, disappearance, and murder of migrants, on August 2nd Julio Fernando arrived safely in a migrant shelter in the state of Mexico, along with other caravan participants. The shelter, Casa San Juan Diego, is located near the train tracks in the municipality of Tultitlán. It is known as a high risk zone among migrants and has earned the nickname “the town of death.” As one local resident states, “Here they can kill any migrant, and no one says anything. Anyone of them (can be killed). Above all by police, and no one says anything at all, it’s not even investigated.”

It was perhaps with this mindset that municipal police picked up Julio Fernando as he rested in the train yard near the shelter just days after his arrival. Witnesses say he was detained by police, accused of partaking in a robbery, and taken into their custody. Hours later, Julio Fernando’s body was found near the train tracks; the victim of a severe attack that ended his life. Police deny any involvement in the murder and the case is currently under investigation.

Julio Fernando’s death deeply affected other migrants, and those who had participated with him in the Paso a Paso Hacia la Paz Caravan. In response, on Saturday, August 13th, they planned to march from the San Juan Diego shelter, to the site where his body was found.

Sadly, this act of remembrance was met with hostility from a group of around 30 people, who gathered outside the shelter and prevented the group from leaving. Claiming that migrants bring problems and violence to the community, they called for the shelter’s closure. Attempts were made to enter the building, presumably to forcibly remove the migrants and staff who were gathered inside.

Despite some local opposition to the migrants’ presence in the community, other neighbors claim that the violence comes mostly from local police, who take advantage of the migrants’ irregular status in the country.

While investigators take up the question of who and what exactly caused Julio Fernando’s death, his family in Guatemala is preparing for the burial of their loved one. Julio Fernando’s dream of working in the U.S. in order to support his grandparents and eight-month-old daughter back home will never be realized. Tragically, he is now among the thousands who have lost their lives on a forced journey to find decent work opportunities in the very country whose trade policies help to destroy any chance for economic security in Central America.

Photos courtesy of Irineo Mujica Arzate.