"Our conflict is not internal, but imposed": Lessons from Colombia for U.S. aid to Central America

By Julia Duranti, Witness for Peace Colombia

In a January op-ed for the New York Times, Vice President Joe Biden called for $1 billion in aid to Central America to address the migration and human rights crisis, citing Colombia as a successful example of U.S. intervention in Latin America. More details on the State Department’s proposal for the Northern Triangle have since emerged, and it appears that social, economic and development aid programs comprise 80 percent of the requested funds—a perfect inversion of Plan Colombia’s counternarcotics and counterinsurgency aid approved 15 years ago. While deemphasizing military aid is a positive development, the current proposal from the Department of State would maintain military and security funding for Central America at current levels, in addition to the separate Department of Defense budgets for foreign military aid.

There is also troubling language about “trade promotion” and economic development that is code for Washington Consensus policies of free trade, privatization and foreign investment.  The current fraught reality in Colombia, a partial result of Plan Colombia and its successor programs and a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with the U.S. implemented in 2012, demonstrates that throwing money at the related issues of organized crime, violence and forced displacement – instead of addressing how the same policies actually drive those phenomena – does not solve human rights crises in Latin America.

U.S. intervention in Colombia has been expensive, costing U.S. taxpayers over $9 billion since 2000, not to mention the enormous human cost of the militarization of Colombia’s countryside. Of the seven million victims of the conflict registered since 1954, 5.9 million victimizations have occurred since 2000, when U.S. funding began to support Colombian security forces already known for collaboration with brutal paramilitaries. While paramilitaries officially demobilized in 2005, many simply reformed into loosely organized criminal structures that the Colombian government calls BACRIM, or criminal gangs. The BACRIM act as guns-for-hire involved in drug trafficking, illegal mining, extortion, human trafficking, and protection services for wealthy land and business owners along with multinational corporations.

Now the biggest threat to citizen security, the BACRIM carry out threats, forced disappearances and assassinations against members of Colombian social movements. In January they were responsible for a wave of threats against Colombian journalists and human rights defenders, as well as the 2014 spike in death threats against more than 150 human rights workers, activists and politicians, dubbed “Black September.” The splintering and reclassification of the paramilitaries as BACRIM allows their activities to be painted as a “climate of lawlessness” that justifies U.S. intervention and support for the Colombian state—as if both states had not tacitly encouraged the creation of these groups in the first place via proxy financial support to corrupt armed forces and neoliberal economic policies that decimated economic opportunities outside the informal or illegal sectors.

At six million people, Colombia’s internally displaced population is the second largest in the world. Some are rural farmers driven from their land by Plan Colombia-funded militarization and aerial herbicide fumigations intended to eradicate coca crops. In other cases, powerful monoculture palm oil and banana operations have collaborated with legal and illegal armed actors to force communities off their land. Additional examples of this type of development include sugar cane production for ethanol that has all but replaced agriculture in southwestern Colombia, while the cut flower industry heavily promoted by USAID has devastated food security in the savannah region surrounding the capital of Bogotá.

Even as the U.S. government has promoted these industries in Colombia, it has protected U.S. corporate interests by privileging U.S. corn, ethanol and other agricultural exports to Colombia under the FTA. In the three years since the FTA was implemented, U.S. exports to Colombia have skyrocketed and Colombia has seen its trade surplus of $8.7 billion evaporate and balloon into a trade deficit of $2 billion. Unable to compete with the flood of subsidized U.S. imports, small-scale producers have been driven out of the market, prompting thousands of Colombians to take to the streets in protest of the FTA and related policies in 2013 and 2014.

Violent displacement, the proliferation of paramilitarism via BACRIM, some of the highest corruption in Latin America, widespread impunity for human rights violations and one of the largest gaps between rich and poor in the world continue to haunt Colombia as problems that Plan Colombia successor programs and the FTA failed to address, or even exacerbated. Implementing the same strategy in Central America — already reeling from high violence and crime along with its own FTA with the U.S., DR-CAFTA — is unlikely to lead to better results. If the Obama Administration wants to get serious about a plan for Central America, it should pressure Congress to fund policies that address the true drivers of organized crime and forced migration, like U.S. demand for drugs and harmful trade agreements that privilege large corporations and the wealthy elite at the expense of local economies and communities. 

Ciudades Modelos: El nuevo experimento neoliberal en Latinoamérica

Por Elizabeth Perkins, Equipo de APP Honduras

La competición. Es un concepto inherente a la meritocracia estadounidense, la mentalidad que uno se puede zafar de cualquier situación difícil con suficiente determinación. La política económica del neoliberalismo promueve la competición como herramienta para promover el desarrollo económico. Se fundamenta en la suposición (hipótesis?) de que la competición incrementa la calidad y eficiencia. Para que un país ‘en desarrollo’ pueda crear trabajos desesperadamente necesitados, es necesario competir con otros países en atraer inversión extranjera. Esta ideología se manifiesta en los Programas de Ajustamiento Estructural (enlace en ingles), los tratados de libre comercio (enlace en ingles) como DR-CAFTA (enlace en ingles), y el establecimiento de zonas francas. Más recién, el proyecto de las Ciudades Modelos en Honduras ha capturado la imaginación de los economistas que promueven el libre comercio y la inversión extranjera como la forma de salir de la crisis económica del país.

Las promesas de desarrollo no son nuevas para Latinoamérica. Hace casi una década, DR-CAFTA consolidó políticas neoliberales que ya estuvieron puestas en práctica. Cuando CAFTA fue firmado en 2006, se le dijo al pueblo de Centroamérica que un incremento al comercio, a la inversión extranjera directa, a la disponibilidad del trabajo, y a la exportación provocaría un aumento de los ingresos y de la calidad de vida. En 2010, cuando Honduras decidió aumentar el salario mínimo 6.5%, 16 maquilas se mudaron a Nicaragua, donde el salario mínimo estaba a la mitad del de Honduras. Este es solo un ejemplo de la manera en que este tratado prioriza las corporaciones estadounidenses ante de los derechos de los trabajadores. Parece que el próximo paso en una progresión de políticas neoliberales impuestas en Centroamérica es la ley de ciudades modelos en Honduras, recientemente aprobada bajo el nombre: Zonas de Empleo y Desarrollo Económico (ZEDE).

Desde los finales de 2010, Honduras se encuentra debatiendo la cuestión de las ciudades modelos en su territorio. En su encarnación mas recién, las ciudades son definidas como divisiones administrativas del país, sujetas al gobierno central pero con autonomía en cuanto a los sistemas políticos, económicos y judiciales, con reglas claras del mercado que permiten un alto nivel de competición. Dicho en otras palabras, son regiones dentro de un país con poco control o regulación gubernamental. La meta es atraer inversión y generar empleo en regiones deshabitadas del país o en municipalidades solicitando la conversión por consulta popular.

Ha sido un debate intenso promovido principalmente por los representantes del Partido Nacional Porfirio Lobo Sosa (ex presidente ‘elegido’ después del golpe de 2009) y Juan Orlando Hernández (ex líder del Congreso Nacional y Presidente actual). Para que Honduras pudiera acomodar esta idea nueva, primero tuvieron que cambiar la constitución, y luego fue necesario aprobar la ley por un voto mayoritario por parte del Congreso. Aunque esencialmente igual, dicha ley ha pasado por varias encarnaciones. Nació como las ciudades modelos (enlace en inglés) de Paul Romer, luego se redactó como ley, la propuesta conocida como Regiones Especiales de Desarrollo (RED), y actualmente la ley se conoce bajo el nombre de las Zonas de Empleo y Desarrollo Económico (ZEDE). Al inicio, la Corte Suprema de Justicia declaró que la ley de las RED fue inconstitucional en octubre de 2012. Solo dos meses después en lo que ahora se conoce como un ‘mini-golpe,’ 4 del lxs 5 jueces que rechazaron la ley fueron destituidxs de sus puestos. La ley de las ZEDE fue aprobada el siguiente año. El mes pasado nombraron Choluteca como el primer sitio ZEDE.

“Ciudades modelos = Expulsión del pueblo Garífuna de Honduras.” Grupos de resistencia protestan las ciudades modelos frente el Congreso Nacional en Tegucigalpa en enero de 2013. Foto por Elizabeth Perkins
 

Los grupos de la resistencia hondureña citan “una enorme inequidad y brecha social, la cual se incrementó a partir del golpe de estado.” La desigualdad socioeconómica se hace cada vez más drástica, mientras el Congreso Nacional impone más y más leyes neoliberales, como la ley ZEDE. Representantes del FNRP presentaron argumentos en la Corte Suprema de Honduras en febrero pidiendo que lxs jueces declaren la ley ZEDE inconstitucional, como es básicamente la misma ley de RED declarada así en 2012.

Mark Klugmann (enlace en inglés), un norteamericano nombrado por Juan Orlando como el promotor de las ZEDE en el exterior, recientemente dio una entrevista al periódico hondureño El Tiempo. El mismo dijo: “Creo que CAFTA abrió nuevas posibilidades y Honduras, con las ZEDE, se convierte en el lugar más atractivo de la zona CAFTA. Estamos escuchando que personas que tienen empresas en los países vecinos y que están exportando bajo CAFTA, quieren trasladarse a Honduras.” Sostienen, que la ley de las ZEDE ayudará a disminuir la migración (enlace en inglés) porque ofrece varias oportunidades de trabajo.

La Organización Fraternal Negra de Honduras (OFRANEH) comentó en su blog, “La palabra empleo se ha convertido en el señuelo para capturar la imaginación de un pueblo pauperizado y sumido adrede, en la ignorancia y desinformación.” Uno de los problemas más grandes con este plan es que no hay un pedazo de tierra suficientemente grande para acomodar una ciudad de millones de personas. Comunidades campesinas e indígenas como OFRANEH, cuyas comunidades han sido nombradas como sitios posibles de ZEDE, están preocupadas.

Según OFRANEH, la Comisión para la Erradicación del Racismo y Discriminación (CERD) de las Naciones Unidas en su informe de febrero expresó preocupación sobre el impacto que va a tener esta ley ZEDE en grupos indígenas y afrodescendientes. El informe urge el gobierno hondureño a reevaluar la compatibilidad de la ley con tratados internacionales de derechos humanos cuya ratificación protegen a los grupos indígenas y afrodescendientes.

“El partido nacional desde su fundación se ha distinguido por una actitud paradójicamente antinacionalista, siendo en estos períodos donde han manejado las riendas del poder, que se han caracterizados en la entrega de territorio nacional y la subordinación a las compañías bananeras,” dice OFRANEH. Según los intereses de las grandes corporaciones, no los del pueblo, el gobierno hondureño sigue adelante con las ZEDE. Aunque el gobierno estadounidense no está directamente involucrado en este proyecto, promoverá intereses inversionistas de EE.UU., ampliando la brecha cada vez más grande entre los ricos y los pobres en Honduras y el mundo entero.

Charter Cities: The new neoliberal experiment in Latin America

By Elizabeth Perkins, WfP Honduras Team

Competition. It’s an inherent concept of U.S. meritocracy, the ‘pull yourself up by the bootstraps’ mentality. (That’s assuming everyone has boots in the first place). Neoliberal economic policy promotes competition as a tool for economic growth. It is based on the assumption that competition improves quality and efficiency. For a ‘developing’ country to create desperately needed jobs, it must compete with other countries to attract foreign investment. This ideology is manifested in Structural Adjustment Programs, free trade agreements like DR-CAFTA and the establishment of free trade zones. Most recently, Charter Cities in Honduras have captured the imagination of economists touting free trade and foreign investment as the country’s way out of financial crisis.

Promises of development aren’t new to Latin America. Nearly a decade ago, DR-CAFTA consolidated neoliberal policies that were already in place. When CAFTA was passed in 2006, Central Americans were told that increases in trade, foreign direct investment, job availability, and exports would raise incomes and standards of living. In 2010, when Honduras decided to raise its minimum wage 6.5%, 16 textile factories picked up and moved to Nicaragua, where minimum wage was half that of Honduras. This is just one example of how this agreement prioritizes U.S. corporations over the rights of workers. The next step in a progression of neoliberal policies being forced on Central America seems to be Charter Cities in Honduras, recently passed into law with the name Zones for Employment and Economic Development (ZEDE).

Since the end of 2010, Honduras has been debating the idea of charter cities in its territory. In the most recent incarnation, the cities are defined as administrative divisions of the country, subject to central government but given autonomy with political, economic, and judicial systems with clear market rules that allow high levels of competition. In other words, they are regions within a country with little governmental control and regulation. The goal is to attract investment and generate employment in uninhabited regions of the country or in municipalities applying for conversion by referendum.


It has been an intense debate pushed primarily by National Party representatives Porfirio Lobo Sosa (former president ‘elected’ after the 2009 coup) and Juan Orlando Hernandez (former leader of the National Congress, and current President). For Honduras to accommodate this new idea, first the constitution had to be changed, after which the law needed a majority vote in Congress. Though essentially the same, it has passed through different incarnations – born as Paul Romer’s charter cities, then drafted into law as Special Development Regions (RED), and most recently passed as the Special Economic Development Zones (ZEDE) law. The first time around, the Honduran Supreme Court of Justice declared RED’s unconstitutional in October 2012. Just two months later in what became known as a ‘mini-coup,’ 4 of the 5 justices who passed the ruling were removed from their posts. ZEDE’s were passed into law the following year. Last month Choluteca was declared as a site for the first ZEDE.

“Model Cities = Expulsion of Garífuna People of Honduras.” Resistance groups protest model cities outside National Congress in Tegucigalpa in January 2013. Photo by Elizabeth Perkins

Resistance groups cite “an enormous inequality and social divide, which has been increasing since the 2009 coup d’état.” Socioeconomic inequality is becoming more drastic, as the National Congress pumps out more and more neoliberal laws, like the ZEDE. National Front of Popular Resistance (FNRP) representatives presented arguments to the Honduran Supreme Court in February (link in Spanish) requesting the justices declare the ZEDE law unconstitutional, as it’s essentially the same RED law that was declared so in 2012.

Mark Klugmann, named by Juan Orlando as the North American representative to promote the ZEDE externally, was recently interviewed by Honduran newspaper El Tiempo (article in Spanish). He says, “CAFTA opened up new possibilities and Honduras becomes the most attractive place for investment with the ZEDE. Investors in neighboring countries are looking to relocate to Honduras.” He argues that the ZEDE will help slow migration because it will offer a variety of jobs.

The Black Fraternal Organization of Honduras (OFRANEH) commented on their blog (link in Spanish), “The word employment has become the lure to capture the imagination of a people made poor and intentionally sunk into ignorance and disinformation.” One of the biggest problems with this plan is that there is no piece of uninhabited land large enough for a city of several million people. Small farming communities and indigenous groups like OFRANEH, whose homes have been named as potential ZEDE sites, are worried.

According to OFRANEH, the United Nations Commission for the Eradication of Racism and Discrimination (CERD) in their report (in Spanish) last month expressed concern for the impact the ZEDE law will have on indigenous and afro-descendant groups. The report urges the Honduran government to reevaluate the compatibility of the law with international human rights treaties it has signed protecting these groups.

“The National Party, since it’s founding, has distinguished itself with a paradoxical anti-nationalist attitude, the periods in which they’ve been in power being characterized by the turning over of national territory and subordination to the banana companies,” states OFRANEH. In the interest of big business, not that of the people, the Honduran government is moving forward with the ZEDE law. Though the U.S. government is not directly involved in this project, it will serve to further U.S. investment interests, widening the ever-growing gap between rich and poor in Honduras and the rest of the world.